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OIL POLLUTION AND THE COASTAL STATE
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Marine oil pollution is a global problem of tremendously
complex nature involving complicated interaction of many
economic, scientific, technologicaY, political and legal factors.

No single aspect may be successfully treated in isola-

tion.
There is little doubt concerning the relative amount of
oceanic oil pollution that is currently occurring.

Several

recent authoritative national and international studies have
estimated oil pollution from oil transportation activities
alone is in excess of one million metric tons each year. l
The annual estimate of oil discharged by all ocean-oriented
petroleum operations is 1.5 to 2 million metric tons. 2

There

is considerable argument as to the exact nature and magnitude
of oil pollution effects on the marine environment.

However

the possible effects are serious and no responsible entity
argues that efforts to prevent oil pollution should wait until
a definitive understanding is acquired concerning all the undesirable results of such marine pollution.
Although I have already postulated that no single aspect
of marine oil pollution can be successfully treated in complete
isolation, it is, for practical reasons, necessary to limit
1

the scope of this research effort.

The boundaries established

are not absolute and the question posed will be such as to
allow or stimulate consideration of many of the economic, technological and legal aspects previously mentioned.
It will be the purpose of this paper to pose and answer
this question.

. How has the legal competence of a coastal

state been strengthened with respect to that state's ability
to prevent marine oil pollution?

The question by implication

presupposes that a certain change in legal competence is in
fact occurring.

The legal and historical baseline from which

to gauge this gradual change will be established by reviewing
past milestones in oil pollution law.

A closer examination

will then be made of recent evolutionary changes in both international and national oil pollution law subsequent to the
Torrey Canyon Disaster of 1967.

The very global nature of

marine oil pollution predicates eventual conflict between
national interests and existing international law.

Even though

the exact width of the territorial sea is as yet not established, the ubiquitous, all pervasive nature of oceanic oil
pollution makes it a poor observer of man made boundaries and
a difficult subject for man made laws as well.

2

CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
At 8:50 Saturday morning, 18 March 1967, the tanker
Torrey Canyon ran aground on Seven Stones Reef about 16 miles
In addition to being a bonafide

west of Lands End, England.

navigational landmark, these Seven Stones proved to be a legal
milestone in the evolution of new marine oil pollution law.
The legal impact of this supertanker grounding and subsequent
oil pollution of massive scale brought home in dramatic fashion the truly inadequate nature of existing international oil
pollution law.

In a matter of days approximately 100,000 tons

of crude oil were released from the mortally damaged tanker
hu11. 1
tory.

This was the largest single oil spill in maritime hisThe international nature of the problem was obvious.

The ship was owned by a Bermudian corporation registered in
Liberia under long-term charter to a U.S. company and subchartered for that voyage to a British firm.

The Master and

crew were Italian and a Dutch salvage company was later involved.

French and British property was extensively damaged

and both countries incurred tremendous expenses.
ship went aground in international waters.

Finally the

In such circum-

stances, who is responsible, who can take remedial action,
who pays the bill?

Neither international or national law

could provide adequate answers to these and many other pertinent
3

questions.

Advances in technology frequently dictate changes

in the provisions of existing law but in general a major disaster is required to generate the motive power of public
opinion needed to initiate substantive changes.

To under-

stand the many and often controversial changes that occurred
in both international and national oil pollution law subsequent
to the Torrey Canyon incident, one must first have a reasonable
familiarity with the earlier development of marine oil pollution law.
Why is oil pollution a matter of international concern?
Because oil pollution is potentially harmful to many beneficial uses of the oceans and its regulation affects man's historical free use of the sea.

We have recently reached that

point in time where freedom of the seas is being challenged
because it is being interpreted by some as license to pollute
or at least to risk marine pollution.

How did we get to this

point?
General concern for oceanic oil pollution appears to
have originated during the decade following World War T.
Both the United States and the League of Nations attempted to
obtain international agreement on means of preventing oceanic
oil pollution. 2

The United States enacted an Oil Pollution Act

in 1924 and two years later chaired an international conference
on oil pollution in Washington.

This conference was the first

international effort to discuss the technical and legal problems

4

of oil pollution in any detail.

It resulted in the first

International Convention Relating to Oil Pollution which was
however never ratified by any participating nation.

A similarly

unsuccessful effort was mounted in the League of Nations.
The many torpedoed and otherwise damaged tankers of the
U.S. Atlantic coast during World War II demonstrated the hazards of oil pollution.

The ever increasing need for petroleum

products in a burgeoning world economy further emphasized the
need for some form of international control.

Little was accom-

plished until 1954 when the International Convention for the
Prevention of Oil Pollution was concluded in London.

This

Convention became effective when ratified by the requisite
number of nations on 26 July 1958.

It prohibits tankers and

other ships (with certain exemptions) from discharging oil or
oily mixtures within 50 miles of the nearest land or within
any of several 50 or 100 mile-wide geographic prohibited zones
delineated in Annex A of the Convention.

Article III of this

Convention provided that any contravention of these prohibitions "shall be an offense punishable under the laws of the
territory in which the ship is registered.,,3

Application or

enforcement of the original 1954 Convention is therefore left
strictly to the flag state of the offending ship.4

Many par-

ticipating countries including the U.S. were not satisfied
with this Convention and ratification was in some cases a slow
process.

With certain reservations it was accepted by the U.S.
5

Senate in May 1961 and with the enactment of Senate Bill 2187,
became the Oil Pollution Act of 1961.

The U.S. reservation

concerned oil pollution offenses within its territorial waters
which the U.S. contended should still be subject to existing
U.S. law (Oil Pollution Act of 1924).

Also the U.S. would not

be compelled to finance oily waste disposal facilities ashore
although it would urge port authorities and private contractors
to provide such facilities when existing capability was found
inadequate.
Although the 1954 Convention and subsequent national
implementing legislation had many failings, they did result
in the first mandatory shipboard record of oil and oily waste
disposal.

The "Oil Record Book" specified in Annex B of the

Convention required a detailed accounting of all ballasting,
deballasting and cleaning of both cargo oil and bunker fuel
tanks.

The record book was then to be signed by the officer

in charge of the operation being reported and the ships's Master.

The oil record book was to be made available to the

authorities of any contracting state when the ship in question
was within a port of that state.

Violations of various provi-

sions of the Convention including false or inaccurate statements in the oil record book could result in fines from $100
to $2500, revocation of license for ships' officers and up to
six months imprisonment.

The 1954 Convention as adopted by

many signatory nations depended very heavily on these participating states for enforcement.
6

There was little uniformity

of fines or penalties and consequently little real uniformity
of enforcement on an international basis.

The basic complaint

of coastal states was that this convention was heavily slanted
in favor of ship and cargo owners' interests and did considerably less to protect the interests of the coastal state.
The law was corrective or remedial in nature and not really
preventive.

Although the Convention was strengthened somewhat

by amendment in 1962, which provided a more realistic definition of oil pollution and extended some prohibited zones, the
law remains essentially ineffective in a preventive sense.
Even within the territorial waters enforcement by a coastal
state is fraught with many almost insurmountable difficulties.
Detection and proof of violation are a serious problem.

It's

not that the coastal state lacks the authority to enforce the
law immediately adjacent to her coast.

The 1958 Convention

on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone requires foreign
vessels exercising the right of innocent passage to comply
"with the laws and regulations enacted by the coastal state
in conformity with these articles and other rules of international law."S

But unless the offending ship is caught in

the act of discharging oil within the territorial sea, it is
almost impossible to invoke the limited provisions of the Convention.

And what of oil discharged just outside the national

limits of a coastal state's jurisdiction?

This is clearly a

matter for the flag state to take the required corrective
7

action if the damaged state has all the needed evidence.
Actual aerial photographs of a ship discharging oily waste
have in several cases not constituted sufficient evidence
because they were not accompanied by a sample of the liquid
retrieved in the ship's wake.*

Both the 1954 Conference and

the amending Conference in 1962 recognized this problem of
enforcement and attached to their Convention a Resolution which
states in part •

• "The only entirely effective method known

of preventing oil pollution is the complete avoidance of the
discharge of persistent oils into the sea and .

. measures

are possible [now} which would enable this to be substantially
achieved. tt6
One must recognize that this discussion centers thus far
on prohibiting only intentional or inadvertent discharges of
oil and oily waste within certain geographic zones.

For in-

stance oil released as a result of a marine casualty would
not be a violation of the 1954 Convention.

The question of

pollution of the open ocean beyond national jurisdiction was
also considered in the 1958 Geneva Law of the Sea Conference.
Article 24 of the Convention on the High Seas provided that
"Every state shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution
of the seas by the discharge of oil by ships or pipe-lines or

*The Convention specifies that to be considered oily
waste, the oil content of the discharge must exceed 100 parts
per million.
8

resulting from the exploitation of the sea bed and its subsoil
taking account of existing treaty provisions on the subject."
This then was the status of oil pollution law when the
Torrey Canyon grounded.

The law simply did not anticipate

such a massive oil spill disaster, although several coastal
countries attempted earlier to deal with liability for open
ocean marine casualties.

The overwhelming power and influence

of shipping and oil company interests had managed to delay
substantive liability legislation to govern international oil
pollution from either accidential or negligent causes.

9

CHAPTER III
COASTAL STATE'S DILEMMA
Let's look more closely at the legal problem marine oil
pollution poses for the coastal state.

What is it that dic-

tates a need for legal protection from marine oil pollution and
how may the coastal state achieve such protection?
legal protection one must have a legal complaint.

To acquire
The concept

and definition of marine pollution is certainly the starting
point needed as a basis for any anti-pollution legislation and
subsequent regulation enforcement.

In the narrowest sense any

alteration of the natural quality of sea water would be marine
pollution, but this approach would remove one of the valuable
uses of the ocean, i.e., its quite useful assimulative capability.

A more practical definition and one generally agreed

upon would be any measurable alteration of the marine environment (or sea water quality) which detrimentally alters any of
the products, resources or marine life beneficially used by
man.

There are several compelling reasons for defining marine

pollution in terms of injury to the beneficial uses of the
marine environment.

For our purposes the most pertinent of

pollution and has been the primary legal precedent for establishing the liability of one nation-state for causing injuriou
pollution (of air or water) to another state.

The decision in

this case between the U.S. and Canada has been interpreted as
imposing a duty upon one nation to prevent injuries to the
beneficial uses of the air or water of a neighboring state. 2
Should the state move unilaterally to prevent harm to its
coastal environment or should it depend upon the evolution of
international law to take care of its national interests in
this regard?

There has in recent years, particularly since

the Torrey Canyon incident, been great differences of national
legal opinion on this question.
many and varied.

These differences have been

Undeniably the slow rate at which effective

action has been taken internationally has favored unilateral
legislation.

However, the biggest stumbling block to inter-

national progress in the formulation of effective marine
pollution law has been the dissatisfaction of the coastal stat
with the legal interpretation of the word liability itself.
The shipping and cargo-owning interests favor what is called
fault liability--that is, liability dependent on proving negligent responsibility or fault.

The coastal interests claim

that proof of fault is not germane and that the ship or cargoowner (or both) are liable for oil spill damage no matter what
the cause, simply because the damage resulted from their actio
or ownership.

Had the oil not been there in transhipment, no
11

damage could have resulted.
Liability.

This is termed Strict or Absolute

After the Torrey Canyon grounding it was widely

recognized that from the coastal state's viewpoint the amended
London Oil Pollution Convention of 1954 was almost totally
inadequate as to both scope and enforcement.

A particularly

strong opinion was voiced by many coastal nations concerning
the need to allow the coastal state to take early action to
prevent oil pollution damage to their coasts when an oil spill
occurred outside of their territorial waters.
Shortly after the Torry Canyon grounded, British Prime
Minister Harold Wilson called upon the United Nations Intergovernmental Maritime Consultive Organization (IMCO) to meet
in extraordinary session to consider possible changes in international maritime 1aw. 3

As a direct result of IMCO's study

the International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage
was convened in Brussels on 10 November 1969 with 54 nations
represented.

This Conference produced two significant new

Conventions on marine oil pollution:

The International Con-

vention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of
Oil Pollution Casualties and the International Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage. 4

These Conventions

attempted to address two basic inadequacies of existing law:
How to cope with an oil pollution threat that originates in
international waters and how to establish liability and provide funding to redress oil pollution damage.
12

The first convention mentioned, commonly referred to as
the "Intervention Convention", allows any state following a
maritime casualty on the high seas to take such action as may
be necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave or imminent danger to their coastline or related interests from po11ution or the threat of pollution of the sea by oil.

This

convention further allows a coastal state to take any action
proportionate to the pollution damage, actual or threatened,
including the complete destruction of the oil tanker and or
its cargo. 5
The second convention, known as the "Liability Convention,"
provides that the owner of a tanker is liable for any pollution
damage caused to a coastal state by oil discharged from his
ship.

Under this convention, the tanker owner may limit his

liability for any single incident to $134.00 for each ton of
ship's cargo oil capacity not to exceed 14 million dollars.
Any tanker owner subject to this convention (18 countries signed
it originally) and whose ship carries more than two thousand ton
of cargo oil must maintain insurance or an equivalent fund equal
to the limit of his convention liability.
Both of these conventions, when they enter into force,
forma11Y,wi11 provide fairly powerful tools to prevent or redress oil pollution damage to the coastal state.

Yet there

are several coastal states which are less than satisfied with
the results of the 1969 Brussels Conference.
13

Possibly the most vocal and surely the most dramatic
objection to these recent conventions has come from Canada.
It is instructive to examine both Canada's objections and her
unilateral legal actions to determine their validity and
rationale.

It is particularly pertinent from a

u.s.

viewpoint

to understand our neighbor's actions since the U.S. maintains
that Canada's unilateral extension of jurisdiction is an unacceptable infringement of the freedom of the seas. 6
As a participant in the 1969 Brussels Conference, Canada
strongly advocated a liability convention which would provide
for absolute liability, compulsory insurance, and a pollution
damage fund based on tanker deadweight tonnage.

Canada add i-

tionally proposed that the ship owner be liable to a fixed
amount for pollution damage beyond which the cargo owner would
be held liable if damages had not been adequately covered. 7
The conference was deadlocked between those that favored fault
liability and those that advocated absolute liability and a
compromise resulted.

This compromise called for a form of

strict liability but with several critical exceptions.

In the

Canadian view, it amounted to fault liability with the burden
of proof falling on the ship owner to cover the exceptions.
When the marine accident does not fall within the several
exceptions the ship owner is liable for oil pollution damage
claims up to $134 per ton or 14 million dollars, whichever
is less.

This approach was built into the 1969 Brussels Lia-

bility Convention and was unacceptable to the Canadians.
14

When

this Liability Convention came to a vote in the 1969 Conference,

34 countries approved, 10 abstained, and Canada alone

cast a dissenting vote.

In the words of the Canadian Secretary

of State for External Affairs, Canada was opting for a "Victim
Oriented" law that was designed not to support the ship owner,
but to protect the overwhelming interests of the coastal state
endangered by oil pollution.

Canada also abstained from voting

on the Brussels Intervention Convention, claiming that the
reservation which required a marine accident to have "already
occurred" before action could be taken was too severe a limitation.

It was again in Canada's view a remedial but not a pre-

ventative proscription.

Canada contended that rather than wait

passively for a poorly founded tanker to have a disastrous
accident, the coastal state should be able to impose certain
safety standards or preconditions for tanker entry into potentially hazardous coastal areas.
Canadian concern for marine oil pollution was dramatically
highlighted on 4 February 1970 when the Liberian tanker "Arrow"
went aground on Cerebus Rock in Chedabucto Bay, Nova Scotia,
while enroute from Venezuela with a cargo of 16,000 tons of
bunker C fuel oil. 8

Despite her small size when compared to

the Torrey Canyon, the "Arrow" grounding did cause extensive
pollution damage to several hundred miles of Canadian coastline.

On 6 February the Ministry of Transport invoked the

anti-pollution provisions of the newly amended Canada Shipping
15

Act and ordered the tanker and her cargo destroyed. 9

The

Canada Shipping Act at that time did not provide for recovery
of pollution damages although it did give the Canadian government the authority to take remedial action inside its territorial waters necessary to limit damage.

Cost of the required

clean-up was estimated to exceed $3 million.

The owners of

"Arrow" were able to respond to damage claims under an existing
voluntary international agreement, but only to the amount of
$1.2 million.
The Arrow incident and the planned 1970 experimental
Arctic Voyage of the U.S. tanker Manhatten convinced Canadian
authorities that additional comprehensive marine pollution
legislation was needed.

This legislation would be designed

to overcome all of Canadian reservations with respect to the
Brussels Conventions.

In particular, Canadian representatives

to the Brussels Conference had advocated an International
Pollution Convention which would regulate not only petroleum
pollutants but all forms of potential marine pollutants.

Can-

ada's first move was taken on 7 April 1970 when her U.N. representative made written declaration that Canada would no
longer be bound by the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in any matters concerning "the prevention or control of pollution or contamination of the marine
environment in areas adjacent to the coast of Canada.,,10

On

the following day, Bill C-202, An Act to Prevent Pollution of

16

Areas of the Arctic Waters Adjacent to the Mainland and Islands
of the Canadian Arctic and Bill C-203, An Act to Amend the
Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act were introduced in the
Canadian Parliament.

Both bills subsequently became Canadian

Law and have stirred considerable international controversy.11
Bill C-202, later entitled Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention
Act, asserted Canadian jurisdiction for purposes of pollution
prevention to all waters up to 100 nautical miles from every
point of Canadian land above the sixtieth parallel of north
latitude.

Subsequent implementing regulations by way of amend-

ment to the Canada Shipping Act (and others) regulate vessel
construction standards, safety features required, qualification
of master and navigator, navigational equipment, routing requirements, etc.

It is in all respects a very comprehensive

law -- for instance, "waste" is defined as:
any substance that if added to any waters would
degrade or alter or form a part of a process of
degradation or alteration of the quality of those
waters to an extent that is detrimental to their
use by man or by animal, fish or plant that is
useful to man and any water that contains a substance in such a quantity or concentration, or
that has been so treated, processed or changed
by heat or other means, from a natural state that
it would, if added to any waters, degrade or alter
or form a process of degradation or alteration of
the quality of those waters to an extent that is
detrimental to their use by man or by any animal,
fish or plant that is useful to man. 1 2
Further absolute liability is the standard applied.

Lia-

bi1ity for damages resulting from disposal of wastes in the
Arctic is extended to:
17

a.

Any person who is engaged in exploring for
or exploiting any natural resource on any
land adjacent to Arctic waters or in any submarine area subadjacent to the Arctic waters.

b.

Any person who carries on any undertaking on
the mainland or islands of the Canadian Arctic
or in the Arctic waters.

c.

The owner of any ship that navigates within
the Arctic waters and the owner or owners of
the cargo of any such ship.

These persons are liable for all costs and expenses incurred
by the government in preventing, correcting or repairing any
resultant pollution of the Arctic
and
for all actual loss or damage incurred by any other persons.
Any of the individuals engaged in the Arctic as above
described must also furnish evidence of financial responsibility.
The Governor in Council may establish what are termed
Shipping Safety Control Zones within the 100 mile radius previously mentioned.

In these Shipping Safety Control Zones

the most complete control of transitting shipping is exercised.
The regulations for this control of shipping cover hull and
fuel tank construction, construction of propulsion and auxiliary
machinery, steering and propulsion control equipment, the manning of the ship, maximum quantity and stowage of potentially
hazardous materials or cargo, the ship's maximum freeboard,
and the types and quantity of charts, tide tables and other
navigational documentation to be carried.
18

The law further specifies the qualification and authority
of implementing officials designated

as'~ollution

Prevention

Officers."
With the passage of the Act to Amend the Territorial Sea
and Fishing Zones Act, similar anti-pollution authority was
extended to cover Canada's now widened territorial waters.
What is the basis for

u.s.

objection to the Canadian

approach to preserving the fragile environment of the Arctic?
Certainly little doubt exists that the Arctic environment is
of a rather special and delicate nature and demands protection.
The U.S. objection is not based on what would be achieved in
terms of environmental protection, but rather hinges on Canada's
unilateral assertion of jurisdiction over portions of oceanic
real estate outside of her territorial waters.

This unilateral

exercise of jurisdiction over areas of the high seas is not
in conformity with Article 2 of the Geneva Convention on the
High Seas which states:
The high seas being open to all nations, no state
may validly purport to subject any part of them
to its sovereignty.
The u.S. published statement on the Canadian Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act went on to say:
The enactment and implementation of these measures
would affect the exercise by the United States and
other countries of the right to freedom of the seas
in large areas of the high seas and would adversely
affect our efforts to reach international agreement
on the use of the seas.
International law provides
no basis for these proposed unilateral extensions of
jurisdiction on the high seas, and the United States
can neither accept nor acquiesce in the assertion of
such jurisdiction. 1 3

19

Canada on the other hand by way of rebuttal made a
detailed reply covering many of the reasons which prompted
Canada to take positive steps to prevent pollution of the
Canadian Arctic waters.

She made critical comment concerning

several instances where, in the Canadian view, the U.S. had
failed to conform to its own strict interpretation of freedom
of the high seas.

Allusion was made to the U.S. 1935 claim

of authority to extend customs enforcement out to 62 miles,
the U.S. establishment of exclusive fishery zones outside its
own 3 mile territorial sea and its recently passed legislation
asserting exclusive pollution control jurisdiction out to 12
miles.

Canada was particularly critical of the U.S. unilateral

interferences with the freedom of the high seas during nuclear
tests which appropriated to u.S. use vast areas of the Pacific
Ocean and could have constituted a grave peril to those who
might use such areas during a test.

The most significant com-

mentary however was the statement that any danger to the
environment of a state was a threat to its national security.
From this standpoint the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention
Act was based on overriding and internationally recognized
right of self-defense.

The other linch pin in the Canadian

argument was that "it is a well established principle of international law that customary international law is developed by
state practice." l 4

Canada cites as an outstanding example of

state practice later accepted as international law, the 1945
20

Truman Proclamation announcing the U.S. claim to jurisdiction
over their continental shelf.
In terms of bulk oil shipping, the Canadian law has yet
to be tested although the law is being applied to those involved
in Arctic oil exploration and exploitation. l S

The Canada Ship-

ping Act has been amended and any commercial shipping in the
Canadian Arctic will certainly be affected.

Large scale

exploration is being conducted in the Canadian Arctic by American, Canadian, British, French and German oil interests. 1 6

It

is only a matter of time before the volume of proven oil reserves
makes large scale shipment of Arctic oil a reality.

21

CHAPTER IV
ENDS VERSUS MEANS -- A PROPOSAL
The Brussels Conventions have been emulated in national
anti-pollution legislation by several states including the
United States. l

Both NATO and the United States have strongly

advocated a total ban on tanker flushing at sea by 1975. 2
There exists little doubt that considering the ever increasing
world need for oil, massive and irreparable damage will be done
to the marine environment unless drastic worldwide corrective
action is taken now.

Then one must ask, why all the furor over

Canada's attempt to protect the Arctic which is surely in her
national and equally in the world's international best interests
The complaint voiced does not concern Canada's objectives, but
her unilateral method of achieving those worthy objectives.
If the international community including the U.S. would look
at this impasse in that dual light, a plausible course of actio
suggests itself.

Agree (even with several reservations) that

state action does

(or has historically) create a precedent or

basis for future international law.
The Arctic is a fine example of an area where much valuable experience could be gained by attempting to implement a
new and more stringent anti-pollution law.

The Antarctic was

after all the subject of an innovative international agreement
which allows many nations to work in harmony largely because
22

no single national sovereignty is exercised there.

Take a

similar tack in the Arctic except on a regional basis involving all countries which are contiguous with or lie north of
the Arctic circle.

There are two possibilities implicit here.

The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act or an
agreed modification thereof could be adopted by an Arctic
Regional body for implementation on a trial basis.

The two

biggest Arctic states, Russia and Canada, are in quite remarkable agreement already on measures needed to protect the Arctic
Ocean.

This step would remove the somewhat artificial stigma

of being a unilateral solution and allow a more objective trial
of specific regulations.
The next step would be to have each Arctic state implement the Canadian plan (or mutually acceptable variation) in
their respective Arctic waters area as an agent of the United
Nations.

We've certainly had many a U.N. Peace Keeping Force

in the past, why not a U.N. sponsored Environmental Protection
Group for the Arctic?

Any new body of law is bound to need to

be modified based on operational experience.

The model when

well adapted to the strict environmental demands of the Arctic
could prove a good point of departure for a worldwide and truly
international marine environmental protective regime.

Certainly

such a comprehensive marine regime is needed and will ultimately evolve.

Why not capitalize on an opportunity to learn

in an area not presently trammeled by generations of commercial
23

usage, custom, and political bias?

The U.S. original note

of protest mentioned an intention to invite interested states
to join in an international conference designed to establish
rules for proper management of the Arctic beyond national
jurisdiction.

It is strongly suggested that the 1972 Stockholm

Conference on the Human Environment would be a good opportunity
to tender this belated invitation.
The regional and ultimately international nature of marine
environmental protection stems from two quite practical considerations.

First, marine pollution is not noticeably

to national boundaries.

subject

Second, it is one thing to write com-

prehensive regulatory legislation for a wide ocean area--it's
quite another matter to enforce this legislation in an effective
manner.

The resources alone needed to patrol the approaches to

Arctic shipping lanes and prevent or regulate entry or otherwise implement the Canadian law may become too much of a
national burden.

It's no problem at the moment because large

scale bulk oil shipping has yet to begin.

All indications are

that volume shipping through Arctic waters is not too far off.
In this connection it is worthy of note that the Canadian government has recognized the importance of enhancing their polar
icebreaking capabilities and have evidenced considerable interest in learning from recent Arctic patrol experiences of other
northern countries.

In April of last year the Canadian govern-

ment (House of Commons Standing Committee on Indian Affairs
24

and Northern Development) appropriated funds to gain expert
advice on polar icebreakers from Wartsila Shipyard, Helsinki,
Finland.

A quite detailed study was made of the legal rela-

tionship between Canadian icebreaker capacity and Canadian
assertion of jurisdiction in Arctic waters.

The entire com-

mit tee discussion brought out quite clearly that no matter how
control was exercised, i.e., by whatever vehicle, effective
control was central to the credibility of the Canadian Arctic
Pollution Prevention legislation. 3

In the minutes of this

House of Commons committee meeting were related the generally
sympathetic responses of several Arctic and Northern European
countries to the Canadian initiative on the Arctic environment.
To varying degrees their only reservations involved the unilateral nature of Canadian action.
The patrol of the entire Arctic Ocean approaches in the
event of large scale oil shipment would be an immense undertaking.

In the view of many it would pose too much of a finan-

cial burden for Canada alone.
regional approach.

All the more argument for a

The present International Ice Patrol would

offer an excellent administrative and organizational model
from which there would be available a wealth of operational
experience.

Beside the obvious cost of operating an oversized

Arctic Coast Guard, the matter of funding oil spill prevention
and/or clean up costs is a big consideration.

The Canadian

goal of full and absolute liability for all pollution damage
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Are such large

involves a tremendous financial capability.
amounts available for anti-pollution funding?

Certainly the

funds are available if one takes a hard look at the economics
of the bulk oil shipping industry.

The new economics of the

giant tanker provides enormous profits.

For instance, in 1970

the voyage charter of a Norwegian 100,000 deadweight ton tanker
from the Persian Gulf to Great Britain brought a freight rate
of $19.00 per ton with owner's total operating costs of only
$2.40 per ton.

In the same year a smaller tanker of 40,000

tons was purchased for $2 million.

She was paid for in twelve

months, plus a net profit of $3 million. 4

Operating costs de-

crease markedly as tanker size increases.

A 250,000 DWT tanker

cost about $20 million in 1970.

One such tanker on a three

year charter at $3.70 per ton per month realized gross earnings
of over $34 million. 5

So the money's there; it's a matter of

equitable distribution again.

We have for years looked upon

the marine environment as a free good of inexhaustible quality
and at no cost to the user.

It is becoming rapidly apparent

that such an externality must be resolved in favor of mankind.
A viable environment is an absolute necessity for human survival; therefore, it cannot be used nor abused without cost.
The user must pay a reasonable price for its profitable use of
the oceans.

This being the case, it seems futile to fault

Canada too heavily for attempting to gain a needed head start
on a serious problem of recognized authenticity and global
consequence.

It is no longer an argument of whether the ends
26

justify the means, but a question of adopting valid coastal
state objectives and methods by a regional and/or an international authority.
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CHAPTER V
WHAT REMAINS -- A PREDICTION

A great deal of change in marine oil pollution law has
occurred since the 1920's and the passage of the British Oil
in Navigable Waters Act of 1922 and the U.S. Oil Pollution Act
of 1924.

Indeed these laws were the first modern day attempts

by a sovereign state to acquire legal competence in this field.
We have seen also that the nature of this legal competence has
undergone a significant change.

Initially the coastal state

had a limited legal ability to take remedial action concerning
marine oil pollution, but strictly within its territorial waters.
As time progressed this legal authority has been increased to
allow preventative action by a coastal state as distinguished
from purely after-the-fact remedial efforts.

This increased

coastal state competence to prevent as well as correct marine
oil pollution has in certain specific circumstances been extended to include a national competence outside of territorial
waters.

The three foundations of this increased legal compe-

tence are the 1969 Amendment to the London Oil Pollution Convention of 1954 and the two 1969 Brussels Conventions, the
Intervention Convention, and the Liability Convention previously

28

discussed.*

The strict and methodical application of the

provisions of these three international conventions will provide the coastal state with a very considerably enhanced capability to deal with marine oil pollution.

All three however

have not as yet been brought into universal force for lack of
sufficient national ratifications.

The delay in U.S. ratifi-

cation was evidently the result of attempting to resolve certain
differences between the Brussels Conventions and existing
national legislation.

On 20 May 1970, President Nixon trans-

mitted the two Brussels Conventions and the 1969 Amendment to
the London Oil Pollution Convention to the Senate for their
advice and consent. l

Prior to that date however, President

Nixon signed the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 which
sharply increased penalties for oil spills. 2

It is instructive

to note that two of the major strengths of the Brussels Conventions have been incorporated in this piece of national
legislation.

The new law specifies that strict liability will

prevail, that is proof of negligence is not a factor.

It also

raised the clean-up bill from a maximum of $5 million or $67.00
per gross ton to a maximum of $14 million or $100.00 per gross

*The formal title of these Brussels Conventions are:
"International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High
Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties," sometimes referred
to as the Public Convention, and "International Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage," sometimes referred
to as the Private Convention.
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ton whichever is less.

This latter amount is taken directly

from the provisions of the Brussels Liability Convention.
With the ratification of the three conventions and adjustment
of national legislation to suit coastal states will acquire
a greatly increased competence to handle marine oil pollution
effectively.

But are these three Conventions and resulting

national legislation sufficient to the need?

Obviously Canada

feels that a greater coastal state competence is required at
least in the Arctic.

There exists a wealth of credible scien-

tific research that lends considerable weight to the Canadian
contention that an oil spill in the Arctic is vastly more
serious than one in a moderate climate.

The greatest hazard

stems from the slow rate of biological decomposition of crude
oil at extremely low temperatures.

Dr. R.E. Warner, Professor

of Biology at the Memorial University of Newfoundland, reported
the following in a paper prepared for the Canadian Wildlife
Service:
The decomposition rate of crude oil slows markedly
at lower temperatures, and at 0° centigrade is
drastically reduced, some components of the process
stopping altogether.
Decomposition in the Arctic
Ocean whose temperatures are at 0° centigrade or
below would be very slow indeed.
Where crude oil
is exposed to still lower temperatures, biochemical
decay would be virtually nonexistent and the oil
would persist for decades, perhaps centuries. 3
There is an obvious internal conflict of interests in this
Canadian situation.

It is certainly in the Canadian best inter-

ests to develop the tremendous economic potential implicit in
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the vast mineral reserves of the Arctic.

On the other hand

she must, in the long run, see to the proper protection of
this very fragile hinterland.

What will be the ultimate reso-

1ution of this dilemma and how will it affect the worldwide
legal problem of marine pollution?
In my research and in correspondence and conversation
with Canadian, British and U.S. officials, I am convinced that
the Canadian position is honestly stated.

Canada does not

want to persist in a unilateral defensive posture any longer
than is, in her view, absolutely necessary.

However she will

not abdicate her responsibility to protect the Arctic, which
in the words of Prime Minister Trudeau, "is the most significant surface area of the globe for it controls the temperature
of much of the Northern Hemisphere •

Its continued exis-

tence in unspoiled form is vital to all mankind.,,4

There are

strong pressures being exerted by several world powers to
develop the Arctic, particularly its large oil reserves.

It

is my contention that the resultant of these two forces, to
develop and to protect, will if properly handled provide that
"accommodation of interest" so frequently mentioned in Canadian
writings on this subject.*

This accommodation to which Canadian

*Mr. J.A. Beesley, Legal Advisor to the Canadian Department of External Affairs, commented "we are not so much
interested in gaining international acquiescence to our
(Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act) policy as we are in
seeking an accommodation of interest between coastal states
and shipping states or other countries which might be using
Arctic waters."
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authorities refer could, and I believe will, take one of
these forms:

1.

greater recognition of the Arctic as being somewhat

different from a freely navigable, essentially oceanic high
seas to which all the freedoms of the high seas may not be
strictly applicable. 5
2.

a greater tendency amongst Arctic coastal states to

express a coherent Arctic protection policy which will be much
in line with the present Canadian viewpoint.

This is already

apparent in recent Canadian-Russian discussions. 6
3.

and finally the need for Arctic oil, its abundance and

its nearness to prime markets (particularly

u.s.

and Japan) will

result in the development of surface or submarine tankers which
will satisfy the safety requirements of existing Canadian
law.7, 8
In support of the above contentions it should be noted
that the Canadians are making detailed and carefully orchestrated preparations for the forthcoming United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment which is to begin in Stockholm on
5 June 1972.

The Secretary General of this U.N. sponsored

Environmental Conference is Mr. Maurice Strong, an influential
Canadian business executive and until recently, President of
the Canadian International Development Agency.

It is only

reasonable to assume that given this controlling position, the
Canadian preparations to promote their viewpoint will be characterized by thoroughness, imagination and persuasion.
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By

comparison I have been unable to discover any similarly
cohesive preparation to articulate the U.S. view on the control
of marine pollution.

This impression is exemplified by the

Chairman of the British Royal Advisory Committee on Oil Pollution of the Sea, Lord Wayland Kennet, who made the following
comment concerning U. S. preparations:

liThe United States

rumbles forward, divided between pros and antis to the very
top,

issuing contradictory statements from every vent, but on

the whole more committed to the success of the Stockholm Conference than not." 9
At any rate, I am concerned that the Canadian viewpoint
appears to be better staffed for worldwide presentation than
does our own.

If we wish to influence events at Stockholm

we would appear to have considerable homework yet to be accomplished.
Having examined the legal competence of the coastal state
to deal with marine oil pollution at some length, what will
be the ultimate result of coastal state influence on the
development of international law?

I would conclude by making

the following predictions for international marine pollution
law development in the 1970's:
a.

The Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment

will have a greater than anticipated positive affect on the
strengthening of existing conventions on marine pollution.
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b.

Necessary ratifications will be forthcoming within

a year to place the two 1969 Brussels Conventions and the 1969
London Amendment into force.
c.

The 1969 Brussels Resolution concerning the establish-

ment of an International Compensation Fund for Oil Pollution
Damage will be implemented.

Constructive and successful efforts

will be made by IMCO to include later provision for coverage
concerning marine pollutants other than oil.
d.

International action will result in the total prohi-

bition of the discharge of oil into any part of the high seas
except as the result of an "act of God

ll

or under IIForce Majeure ll

circumstances.
e.

There will occur international acceptance of a Regional

Arctic Marine Pollution regime that is virtually identical to
the present Canadian concept.
f.

There will be established under United Nations auspices

an International Environmental Protection Agency competent to
deal with all forms of marine pollution.
State practice does to a considerable degree affect the
future formulation of international law.

The well documented

and persuasively articulated coastal state's concern with the
protection of her own marine environment will certainly have a
positive influence on the development of international environmental law.

34

NOTES
Chapter I
1. u.s. Government, National Council on Marine Resources
and Engineering Development, Marine Science Affairs - Selecting Priority Programs (Washington, DC: April 1970), p. 21.
2.
United Nations, UNITAR, Marine Pollution, Problems and
Remedies (New York:
November 1970), p. 8.
Chapter II
1.
British Government, Committee of Scientists Report on the
Scientific and Technological Aspects of the Torrey Canyon
Disaster (London:
Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1967),
p , 5-15.
2. M. McDougal and W. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans
(New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1962), p. 849.
3.
F. Artz, Marine Laws - Navigation and Safety, Vol. 2
(Oxford, NH: Equity, 1963), p , 330.
4. M. McDougal, et a1., The Public Order of the Oceans, p.
850.
5.
United Nations Document A/CONF 13/L.52, 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Article 17.
6.
F. Baldwin, ed., Legal Control of Water Pollution (Davis,
CA: University of California, 1969), p. 181.
Chapter III
1.
F. Baldwin, ed., Legal Control of Water Pollution (Davis,
CA: University of California, 1969), p. 171-172.
2.
A. Kuhn, "Trail Smelter Arbitration," American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 32, 1938, p. 787.
3.
"Britain to Press for Tanker Code," The Times, 31 March
1967, p , 1:5.
4.
Norman Wu1f, "International Control of Marine Pollution,"
JAG Journal, December 1970-January 1971, p. 97-98.
35

5.
"International Convention Relating to Intervention on the
High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties," International
Legal Materials, January 1970, p. 25-26.

6.
u.s. Government, Department of State, State Department
Press Release #121, dated 15 April 1970.
7.
E. Gold, "Marine Pollution and International Law," Journal
of Maritime Law and Commerce, October 1971, p. 27.

8.
"Grounded Tanker Leaking Oil is Breaking Apart," New York
Times, 8 February 1970, p. 82:2.
9.
"Grounded Tanker Leaking Oil Splits Off Nova Scotia,"
New York Times, 9 February 1970, p. 78:1.

10. Canadian U.N. Representative Written Reservation Concerning
Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice,
International Legal Materials, Vol. 9, May 1970, p. 598.
11.
"U.S. Rejects Canadian's Claim to Wide Rights in Arctic
Seas," New York Times, 10 April 1970, p. 13:3.
12.
"Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act," Chapter
47, Revised Statutes of Canada, 28 Parliament, 18-19 Elizabeth
II, 26 June 1970, Article 2. (h.).
13. "U.S. Department of State Statement on the Government of
Canada's Bills on Limits of Their Territorial Sea, Fisheries
Zones and Pollution," International Legal Materials, Vol. 9,
May 197 0, p , 6 05 .
14.

Ibid., p , 608.

15. Canadian Government, Department of Energy, Mines and
Resources, Offshore Exploration; Information and Procedures,
August 1970 (Ottawa: 1970), p. 1.
16.
"Canadian Assails Policy on Arctic," New York Times,
20 February 1972, p. 8:1.
Chapter IV
1.
"Curb on Oil Spills Signed by Nixon," New York Times,
4 April 1970, p. 30:1.
2.
"Treaty is Urged to Forbid Flushing Tankers at Sea,"
New York Times, 3 November 1970, p. 1:3.

36

3.
Canadian Government, House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Indian Affairs
and Northern Development Respecting the Subject Matter of
Arctic Icebreaker Service, Statements by Mr. J.A. Beesley,
1 April 1971, p. 7-9.
4.
"Lush Era of the Tanker Tycoons," Newsweek, 19 October
1970, p , 94-96.
5.
p,

Shipping Statistics and Economics, Vol. 2, 7 December 1970,
12-15

Chapter V
1.
"President Nixon Asks Senate Approval of Conventions on
Pollution of the Sea by Oil," Department of State Bulletin,
15 June 1970, p. 756, 757.
2.
"Curb on Oil Spills is Signed by Nixon," New York Times,
4 April 1970, p. 30:1.
3.
Tom Brown, Oil on Ice, Alaskan Wilderness at the Crossroads
(San Francisco:
Sierra Club, 1971), p. 94.
4.
Prime Minister Pierre E. Trudeau in an address to the
Annual Meeting of the Canadian Press, Toronto, 15 April 1970.
5.
J.A. Beesley, "Canada and the Arctic," Journal of Maritime
Law and Commerce, October 1971, p. 3.
6. Murray Goldblatt, "Canadian-Soviet Bilateral Ties:
the
Record and the Prospects," International Perspectives, JanuaryFebruary 1972, p. 23.
7.
Interview with Mr. L.R. Jacobson, Arctic Tanker Program
Manager, Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics, Groton,
CT, 21 December 1971.
8.
"Oil for the Japanese:
9 April 1972, F1:3.

A Global Project," New York Times,

9.
Weyland Kennet, "The Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment," International Affairs, January 1972, p. 42.

37

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adelman, M.A. ::.::.::==-=:..=.:::=....-..::...:==--=-------'=--=--=....::=---=-==-=-----=...=.J;:....I.:..=._L.
Alaskan Oil:
Cost and Supply.
Praeger, 1971.

New York:

American Society of International Law.
International Legal
Materials Current Documents, Vol. IX, January 1970.
Washington, DC:
ASIL, 1970.
Arzt, F.K. Marine Laws - Navigation and Safety, Vol. 1 and 2.
Oxford, NH:
Equity, 1963.
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs.
Current Notes on
International Affairs, Vol. 42, March.
Canberra: Australian Government, 1971.
Baldwin, F.B.
Legal Control of Water Pollution.
University of California, 1969.

Davis, CA:

Beesley, J.A.
"Canada and the Arctic." Journal of Maritime
Law and Commerce, October 1971, p. 1-12.
Bilder, R.B.
"The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention
Act:
New Stresses on the Law of the Sea." Michigan Law
Review, November 1970, p. 1-54.
"Britain Assumes Power to Sink Polluting Ships."
Times, 7 November 1971, I, 4:1.
"Britain to Press for Tanker Code."
p , 1:5.

New York

The Times, 31 March 1967,

Brown, T.
Oil on Ice: Alaskan Wilderness at the Crossroads.
San Francisco:
Sierra Club, 1971.
"Canadian Assails Policy on Arctic."
ruary 1972, p. 8:1.

New York Times, 20 Feb-

Canadian Government.
Secretary of State for External Affairs.
Summary of Canadian Note to U.S. Government Concerning
Canada's Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Bill of
16 April 1970.
International Legal Materials, Vol. 9,
1970, p. 607-615.
The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act.
Chapter 47.
Revised Statutes of Canada, 28th Parliament,
18-19 Elizabeth II, 26 June 1970.
38

An Act to Amend the Canada Shipping Act of 1934
entitled "Oil Pollution Prevention Regulations." saRI
71-495.
Canada Gazette, Part II, Vol. 105, No. 19,
21 September 1971.
Canada Water Act, Chapter 52.
Revised Statutes
of Canada 28th Parliament, 18-19 Elizabeth II, 26 June
1970.
Canada Fisheries Act, Chapter 119. Revised Statutes
of Canada 1952 as amended by Bill C-203, an act to amend
the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones, 4 June 1970.
House of Commons. Minutes of Proceedings of the
Standing Committee on Indian Affairs and Northern Development Respecting the Subject-Matter of Arctic Icebreaker
Service (and other matters relevant to the Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act).
Third session, Twenty-Eighth
Parliament, 1 April 1971.
An Act to Amend the Oil and Gas Production and Conservation Act.
Chapter 30.
Revised Statutes of Canada
1969, 27 June 1969 and Chapter 0-4 Revised Statutes of
Canada 1970, 11 June 1970.
Department of External Affairs.
"Living Resources
of the Sea - Protective Legislation Announced by Canada."
Monthly Bulletin of the Department of External Affairs,
Vol. XXII, No.5, May 1970, p. 130-160.
Department of Energy, Mines and Resources.
Exploration Information and Procedures.
Ottawa:

Offshore
1970.

Committee of Scientists ("Zuckerman Committee"). Report on
the Scientific and Technological Aspects of the Torrey
Canyon Disaster.
London:
Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1967.
"Curb on Oil Spills Signed by Nixon."
1970, p , 30:1.

New York Times, 4 April

Dag Hammarskjold Library.
Environmental Law:
A Partial List
of National and International Legislation.
New York:
United Nations, 10 August 1970.
Frye, J.
"Troubled Oil on Waters."
February 1971, p. 38-47.

Sea Frontiers, January-

Gold, E.
"Marine Pollution and International Law." Journal
of Maritime Law and Commerce, October 1971, p. 13-44.
39

Gold bla t t , M.
"Canad ian- Sovie t Bila teral Tie s :
The Record
and the Prospects."
International Perspectives, JanuaryFebruary 1972, p. 19-24.
"Grounded Tanker Leaking Oil Cargo is Breaking Apart."
York Times, 8 February 1970, p. 82:2.
"Grounded Tanker Leaking Oil Splits Off Nova Scotia."
York Times, 9 February 1970, p. 78:1.

New
New

Hardy, M.
"International Control of Marine Pollution."
Natural Resources Journal, April 1971, p. 292-348.
Harlow, E.H.
"Trend in Mammoth Tanker Terminals."
Petroleum, June 1971, p. 149-152.
Harwood, M.
"We Are Killing the Sea Around Us."
Times Magazine, 24 October 1971, p. 1-10.
Howe, R.J.
"Petroleum Operations In the Sea."
August 1968, p. 29.

World
New York

Ocean Industry,

Hull, E.W.S., et al.
"Introduction to a Convention on the
International Environment Protection Agency." Law of
the Sea Institute, U.R.I., Occasional Paper No. 12.,
September 1971.
International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited.
"TAVALOP" (Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning
Liability for Oil Pollution).
International Legal Materials, 1969, Vol. 8, p. 497-501.
Interview with Mr. W.C. Brodhead, Head Marine Department, Gulf
Oil Company, 1290 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY,
3 January 1972.
Interview with Mr. L.R. Jacobson, Arctic Tanker Program Manager,
Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics, Eastern Point
Road, Groton, CT, 21 December 1971.
Jacobson, L.R.
"Subsea Transport of Arctic Oil - A Technical
and Economic Evaluation." Proceedings.
Third Annual
Offshore Technology Conference, Dallas, TX, 19-21 April
1971, p , 96-107.
Johnson, D.M.
"Canada's Arctic Marine Environment:
Problems
of Legal Protection." Canadian Institute of International
Affairs, July 1970, p. 234-247.
40

Kennet, W. "The Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment."
International Affairs, January 1972, p. 33-45.
Kuhn, A.K.
"Trail Smelter Arbitration." American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 32, 1938, p. 785-789.
Letter from Mr. J.A. Beesley, Head Legal Division, Department
of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada, 4 April 1972.
Letter from Mr. J.H. Birtwhistle, Deputy Chairman, Board of
Steamship Inspection, Ministry of Transport, Ottawa, Canada, 16 November 1971.
Letter from Mr. D.G. Crosby, Director, Resource Management and
Conservation Branch, Department of Energy, Mines, and
Resources, Ottawa, Canada, 22 November 1971.
Letter from Captain W.O. Miller (JAGC), USN, Deputy Assistant
Judge Advocate General for International Law, Department
of the Navy, Washington, DC, 5 November 1971.
Letter from Mr. Myron Nordquist, Office of the Assistant Legal
Advisor for Ocean Affairs, Department of State, Washington,
DC, 5 April 1972.
Letter from Mr. Peter Oreck, Regulation Planning and Legal
Services, Environmental Protection Service, Ottawa, Canada,
10 December 1971.
Letter from Mr. Charles J. Pitman, U.S. State Department, Office of Assistant Legal Advisor for Ocean Affairs, Washington,
DC, 11 November 1971.
Letter from Mr. Robin J. Robinson, Manager, Offshore Operations
Division, Esso Production Research Company, P.O. Box 2189,
Houston, TX, 1 November 1971.
Letter from Mr. James Timpson, Vice President, SOROS Associates
Consulting Engineers, 575 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY,
21 October 1971.
McDougal, M.S., et al.
The Public Order of the Oceans, New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1962.
Neuman, R.H.
"Oil on Troubled Waters:
The International Control of Marine Pollution." Journal of Maritime Law and
Commerce, Vol 2, No.2, 2 January 1971, p. 349-361.
O'Brien, J.T.
Supertanker Collision Prevention.
Unpublished
Thesis for the Naval War College, Newport, RI, 23 March
1972.
41

"Oil for the Japanese:
A Global Project."
9 April 1972, F 1:3.

New York Times,

Padelford, N.J.
Public Policy for the Seas.
M.I.T. Press, 1971.
Petrow, R.
In the Wake of the Torrey Canyon.
David McKay, 1968.

Cambridge, MA:
New York:

"President Nixon Asks Senate Approval of Conventions on Pollution of Sea by Oil." Department of State Bulletin,
15 June 1970, p. 756-757.
Rickard, J.A.
"Offshore Petroleum Production Facilities
Research." Proceedings Seventh Annual Marine Technology
Society Conference, Washington, DC, 16-18 April 1971.
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.
"CRISTAL" (Contract
Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for
Oil Pollution).
International Legal Materials, Vol. X,
January 1971, p. 137-144.
Telephone Conversation with Mr. Charles J. Pitman, U.S. State
Department, Assistant Legal Advisor, Ocean Affairs,
Washington, DC, 8 November 1971.
"The Lush Era of the Tanker Tycoons."
1970, p , 94-96.

Newsweek, 19 October

Timpson, R.J.
"Practicality of Artificial Island Shipping
Terminals." Proceedings Seventh Annual Marine Technology
Society Conference, Washington, DC, 16-18 April 1971,
p , 221-231.
"Treaty is Urged to Forbid Flushing of Tankers at Sea."
York Times, 3 November 1970, p. 1:3.

New

United Nations.
Institute for Training and Research, Marine
Pollution - Potential for Catastrophe, New York, 1971.
Marine Pollution Problems and Remedies,
New York, 1970.
New Challenge for the United Nations,
New York, 1971.
United Nations Conference of Trade and Development.
International Legislation on Shipping, New York, 1968.
42

United States Government.
Council on Environmental Quality.
Ocean Dumping - A National Policy, A Report to the President prepared by the Council on Environmental Quality.
Washington, DC:
U.S. Govt Print. Off., October 1970.
National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering
Development. Marine Science Affairs - Selecting Priority
Programs.
Washington, DC: April 1970.
State Department.
Department of State Press Release
No. 121, of 15 April 1970.
"Statement on Government of
Canada's Bill on Limits of the Territorial Sea." Washington, DC:
1970.
"U.S. Rejects Canadian's Claim to Wide Rights in Arctic Seas."
New York Times, 10 April 1970, p. 13:3.
Wulf, N.A.
"International Control of Marine Pollution."
JAG Journal, December 1970-January 1971, p. 93-100.

43

The

